Despite numerous claims that Russia has shifted to a military footing and is spending approximately 8% of its GDP on defense, the Kremlin can only offset losses of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery through the withdrawal from storage and refurbishment of Soviet-era equipment. However, these reserves do not appear to be limitless.
This conclusion can be drawn by analyzing data from OSINT analysts, who, utilizing satellite images, are counting armored vehicles and artillery systems at open storage sites. To determine when the weapon stocks will be depleted, one can use a method known as linear interpolation. Given the data on reserves from 2021 and 2024, it can be assumed that the decrease is occurring linearly.
For instance, before the large-scale war, the Russians had 6.3 thousand tanks in storage, while in the fall of 2024, this number has decreased to 3.4 thousand. This reduction has occurred across all 16 open sites, except for the "1311 Central Reserve Tank Base" (Verkhnyaya Pyshma), where the number has increased due to transfers from other locations.
However, not all equipment from the storage sites is immediately sent to the front. Due to poor storage conditions, some are sent for lengthy refurbishment or are stripped for parts to create "new" weaponry. Since a portion of these tanks is in "transit" and scattered across various repair factories or closed warehouses, the actual reserves are likely not as low as satellite images from open bases suggest.
On the other hand, not everything in storage is suitable even for "cannibalization." For example, out of 3.4 thousand tanks, only 614 (18%) are in satisfactory condition, 1.7 thousand are in poor condition, and 1.1 thousand are in terrible condition, according to analysts.
Another unknown factor is new production. However, it is unlikely that the Russians should rely heavily on this. According to The Economist, since February 24, 2022, 175 modern T-90M tanks have been sent to the front, while the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates their production in 2024 to be up to 90 units. However, IISS analyst Michael Jørstad claims that most T-90Ms are upgrades of older T-90As.
As the number of the latter decreases, the production of newly created T-90Ms in 2024 may be no more than 28 units. Expert on Russian military capabilities from the Washington Center for European Policy Analysis Pavel Luzin believes that Russia can realistically produce only 30 tanks per year.
When Ukrainians captured a supposedly new Russian T-90M tank in 2023, they discovered that its cannon was manufactured in 1992. This indicates the aforementioned "cannibalization."
The Russians have also "cannibalized" barrels from old towed artillery and mounted them on self-propelled howitzers. Analyst Richard Verreker estimates that by the beginning of 2024, 5-6 thousand such barrels had been withdrawn.
How long the Russians can continue this practice depends on the condition of the remaining 6 thousand units. Michael Jørstad notes that with multiple launch rocket systems, such as the TOS-1A "Solntsepek," the depletion of the barrel resource means much shorter volleys.
Luzin believes that at the current rate of depletion, Russian stocks of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles will reach a "critical depletion point" by the second half of 2026. This is supported by data from the analysis of satellite images of storage bases. From that time, both sides will likely achieve a conditional parity in this regard and will primarily rely on the developments of the past few years – drones and other innovative systems.